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Abstract 
 
In considering the behaviour of market participants, this paper introduces a new variable 
into the model for the determinants of institutional trading costs. By using an ex-ante 
measure of the concentration in the opposite-side of the market, this study suggests that 
traders on the opposite-side of the market herd against an incoming trader looking to 
trade a series of orders. The new variable measures the level of broker competition 
prevailing on the opposite-side of the market and is found to be negatively related with 
price impact.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Schwartz and Shapiro (1990) reported that close to 70 percent of trades on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) originated from institutional investors, a large amount of 
literature has been devoted into finding the determinants of the price impact from 
institutional trading. Within this context, few studies consider the dynamic nature of the 
market participants when studying the determinants of price impact. 
 
In a limit order book such as the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), one can define an 
opposite-side broker as the patient party who controls a current standing limit order. 
Typically, most price impact models have assumed that the opposite-side broker has the 
sole purpose to provide liquidity and thus remain static on the market. In reality, the 
opposite-side broker has the option to place new orders, amend current orders, or 
withdraw orders away from the market. The current study intents to characterise the 
properties of the opposite-side of the market in terms of market depth, and investigate its 
relationship with the price movement associated with institutional trading. 
 
The interaction of the opposite-side of the market has rarely been examined within price 
impact models since these models typically use ex-ante variables, such as market size and 
trade size, in order quantify the average gain or loss an institution will incur due to 
changes in that variable. The dynamic nature of the market participants ensures that the 
opposite-side broker will make decisions conditional and ex-post to the first trade by an 
institution. Since Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) show that traders 
looking to execute large orders may split their trades into a sequence of smaller orders, 
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the reactions of the opposite-side broker concerning the first trade will have a bearing on 
the price impact concerning with subsequent trades. Therefore, it is necessary to identify 
the impact that opposite-side brokers have on the price impact of institutional trades. 
Doing so will add to the current body of literature surrounding the identification of the 
determinants of price impact. Further, it may be used to assist institutional traders whose 
goals are to minimise the execution costs involved in trading.  
 
Instead of examining the ex-post actions of opposite-side brokers (which would require 
the examination of an opposite-side broker’s order flow), this study adds to the current 
price impact literature by introducing a new variable which captures the ex-ante state of 
the market. This variable measures the nature of depth surrounding liquidity on the 
opposite-side of the market in terms of the brokers competing for order flow. The current 
study uses a Herfindahl-indexa to measure both the concentration and competitiveness of 
broker activity within the opposite-side of the market. The nature of the index implies 
that higher values will show that competition is low and depth is focused around a few 
(instead of many) brokers. Using this as a proxy for the state of the opposite-side depth at 
the market price, this study offers competing hypotheses which can be used to explain 
possible reasons for its significance and direction of the concentration variable on the 
price impact of subsequent trading. 
 
                                                 
a Used by Chung, Chuwonganant and McCormick (2004) to measure dealer competition in NASDAQ 
stocks. 
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Results in this study find a significant negative relationship between the index and 
execution costs measured by the Open-to-Trade and Trade-to-Close. This implies that 
lower (broker concentration) levels of the index will be associated with both a greater 
initial and permanent impact in the underlying stock’s price. The paper postulates that the 
reason for this relationship is due to the herding behaviour of brokers on the opposite-side 
of the market acting on the same informative signal. Their combined withdrawal from the 
market after the first trade induces greater price impact for the subsequent trades coming 
from the trade initiator. 
 
Lastly, this research will have important implications on market design. The calculation 
of the index is dependant upon distinguishing between brokers on the opposite-side of the 
market. Evidence of a negative relationship between the depth concentration of the 
opposite side of the market and price impact implies that brokers and institutions will 
prefer a transparent market in order to minimise transactions costs. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
2.1 Market Response Behaviour 
 
The reaction and behaviour of market participants in response to an incoming or executed 
trade is an issue which has been developed in the past. Studies originate from the work of 
Bagshot (1971) who identifies three types of traders present in the market; informed 
traders who trade based on superior information; liquidity-motivated traders, who trade 
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based on cash flow requirements; and pseudo informed traders who trade on information 
which has already been imbedded into a security’s priceb. The presence of these traders 
allows a market maker to create a spread that is based on the market pressure of buyers 
and sellers. The ideas and insight put forth by Bagshot (1971) are later extended into 
theoretical models.  
 
Garman (1976) uses a supply and demand approach for modelling the price formation of 
securities under various types of market structures. He postulates that the role of a market 
maker’s inventory must be considered in the formation of the spread. Otherwise they risk 
the result of market failure under a monopolistic dealer market. Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) extend Garman’s (1976) work by presenting a model where a market maker’s 
spread is conditional upon the previous order. They find that an optimal pricing policy 
can be obtained for a market maker, which is based on the market maker’s levels of 
inventory.  
 
The presence of traders with better information creates a problem for market participants 
on the opposite-side of the market who will have a higher likelihood of trading at a loss. 
Dupont (2000) develops a market making model that considers both spread and depth 
under asymmetric information conditions. He establishes that a market maker has two 
alternatives which are used to combat the information asymmetry problem imposed by 
                                                 
b For the purposes of this study, the liquidity-motivated traders and pseudo informed traders can be placed 
in the same category since trading against either, in the long run, the market maker making a profit. 
Henceforth, we will refer to both types of traders as liquidity traders. 
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informed investors. First, the market maker can increase spreads, thereby lowering the 
probability of trading with an informed trader and trading at a loss. Consequently, this 
will reduce demand from liquidity traders, who are sensitive to price, and therefore 
potential profits. Alternatively, market makers may reduce quoted depth, allowing them 
to lose less against an informed trader while still maintaining the liquidity trader’s 
demand. This action consequently reduces the profitability of the market maker when 
trading against a liquidity trader. Dupont (2000) hypothesises that the trade-off between 
these two options is conditional upon the actual level of information asymmetry present. 
His model finds that changes in depth are more favoured than changes in spread as the 
level of information asymmetry increases. 
 
Empirical studies examining the reaction of a single trader, in response to an incoming or 
executed trade, have been performed to test the theories presented by the studies cited 
above. Many of these studies have investigated the actions of the NYSE specialist since 
their actions play an important role in determining the price of a security. The studies 
focus on the specialist’s revision of quoted price and depth schedules in response to 
informative events and inventory imbalance. 
 
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) investigate the levels of spread and depth around both 
periods of high volume and periods of earnings announcements. Their results are 
consistent with the notion that both spread and depth are reduced in response to the 
anticipated presence of informed traders. Kavajecz (1999) extends this by using the 
methodology of limit order book estimation which permits the examination of order flow 
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from the specialist. He finds that in response to a greater likelihood of informational 
asymmetry, a specialist may reduce quoted depth equal to the amount of the limit order 
trader (who has priority) to protect themselves against adverse selection. These findings 
are consistent with Dupont (2000) and reveal that specialists change quoted depth 
schedules in response to informational events as well as to manage inventory. This is 
different to Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) who use a simultaneous equation 
approach to investigate numerous factors which influence the revision of a specialist’s 
quoted price and depth schedules on the NYSE. Their analysis finds no evidence for 
revisions due to inventory purposes as suggested by Amihud and Mendelson (1980). 
However they show that the specialist is more likely to reduce posted depth (as opposed 
to spread) as the first form of protection against adverse selection in response to large 
transactions.  
 
The above studies cited above were performed on markets with some form of market 
maker presence. More importantly previous studies have shown that the withdrawal of 
depth from a trader who controls a significant proportion of depth at the market price will 
have a significant impact on subsequent incoming trades against that side of the book. 
These studies however, do not examine the order flow from other participants present in 
the market such as limit order traders.  
 
In their investigation of the Paris Bourse, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) examine the role 
that limit order traders play in an exchange. Their analysis of order flow and the order 
book characteristics find that limit order traders improve the efficiency of markets with 
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their level of competition and speed of response in providing liquidity. This suggests that 
the reaction of multiple market participants and their interaction is necessary to grasp the 
nature of the opposite-side of the market. Biais et al. (1995) further generate a conditional 
probability table showing the likelihood of one event taking place directly after another. 
They find that in all cases, one is likely to observe the same event occurring immediately 
after another event of the same kind has just occurredc. This systematic behaviour of 
market participants is consistent with the notion of herding behaviour.  
 
The herding literature originates from the notion that investors act on the same signals 
and trade in the same stock and direction. Shiller (1984) argues that markets may not be 
efficient due to the existence of ‘social movements’ and ‘fashion’ which cause investors 
to herd in the same direction on the perception that the trading decision has been built up 
to result in higher returns. Similarly, Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that investor 
sentiment and overreaction to signals provided by ‘brokers or financial gurus’ can result 
in correlated shifts in demand amongst noise traders.  
 
Herding behaviour is not limited to retail investors. Lakonishok, Shlifer and Vishny 
(1992) hypothesise that institutions may herd for several reasons which may cause 
markets to become more efficient. They may deduce that information is present among 
another institution’s trades and follow their actions, trade on the basis on another 
manager’s portfolio in order to mimic returns, or interpret the same informative signals 
                                                 
c For example, they find that there is a 9.70 percent (9.24 percent) chance of observing a cancellation on the 
bid (ask) side directly following a cancellation at the same side 
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present to the entire market in the same manner. Cont and Bouchard (2000) argue that in 
financial markets, decisions to trade do not need to be sequential, yet rather individual 
decisions based on the same sign. Further, they show how herding behaviour has the 
ability to affect the distribution of returns in institutional execution costs.    
 
Much of the herding literature focuses on analysis regarding decisions to trade. Farmer 
(2008), on the other hand, considers the possibility that traders can cancel orders in 
response to the trade before. Their analysis of large price fluctuations and cancellations 
however yields no significant results, however, since their analysis cannot distinguish 
between a market order and a cancellation. This leads to the examination of the reaction 
of opposite-side traders and the impact they have on subsequent price changes.  
 
2.2 Institutional Trading Costs 
 
The second set of literature related to this study is dedicated towards identifying the 
factors that affect the execution costs of institutional trades. The current study intends to 
determine whether a variable which can proxy for the state of the opposite-side limit 
order depth plays a significant role in the execution costs of sequential institutional 
transactions due to the withdrawal of depth.  
 
Scwartz and Shapiro (1990) found that in 1989, over 70 percent of trades originate from 
institutional investors and their members on the NYSE. Subsequently, much literature has 
focused its attention to the execution costs of institutional trades and its determinants in 
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order to assist a portfolio manager’s investment strategy by identifying the key factors 
influencing the implicit costs of trading.  
 
The execution cost studies originate from Kraus and Stoll (1972) who identify that the 
cause of price impact originates from three sources. They argue that there are three 
explanations for price changes triggered by a transaction. Firstly, short-run liquidity costs 
appear when a large trader finds it difficult to attract liquidity from the opposite-side of 
the market. Secondly, in stocks that have imperfect substitutes to the firm’s securities, 
inelastic demand and supply curves lead to price concessions that lead to greater price 
impact depending on the size of the trade. Finally, the information content conveyed by 
the size of the trade may produce an impact in price that leads to new equilibrium prices. 
 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) extend this work by creating a set of variables 
which can be used to identify the sources of price impact as defined by Kraus and Stoll 
(1972). They show that short-run liquidity costs are consistent with the notion of 
temporary price movements where prices revert back to fundamental values. Further, 
they identify that the imperfect substitution and information arguments both lead to a 
permanent price movement where a new equilibrium price is formed. Finally they define 
the total price effect as the initial impact in price resulting from the institutional trade. 
They find that price movements are permanent for buyer-initiated institutional trades and 
temporary for seller-initiated institutional trades. They document price continuations for 
institutional purchases trades and price reversals for institutional sales suggesting 
purchases are more informative than sales. 
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2.2.1 Empirically Tested Explanatory Variables 
 
Much of the subsequent price impact literature consistently uses these measures in order 
to directly isolate whether a possible variable of interest significantly affects execution 
costs. The following studies are based on this foundation and attempt to analyse different 
general explanatory factors that may better explain price impact. These factors will be 
used as controls for the present paper’s analysis, such that the influence of the state of the 
opposite-side of the market on execution costs can be measured independently. 
 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) suggest that informed traders are likely to trade in larger 
quantities, and therefore should find incur greater permanent price impact. Holthausen et 
al. (1987) empirically verifies this and finds that increases in block size are associated 
with increases in price impact costs. These are found to be robust against alternative 
block definitions. This is consistent with the underlying theory which suggests that larger 
sized trades are associated with higher price impact due to the difficulty in finding 
liquidity providers, or because of their likelihood to convey information. Subsequent 
literature has found it logical to control for the complexity (difficulty) of an institutional 
trade when looking at execution costsd. The theory that large trades convey information 
has been tested by Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) who find evidence 
                                                 
d These studies include; Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Gemmill (1996), Bonser-Neal et al. (1999), 
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) and Frino et al. (2007). 
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against, and argue that informed traders prefer to trade with medium-sized orders. By 
grouping a sequence of orders, studies such as Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Aitken and 
Frino (1996b), Comerton-Forde, Fernandez, Frino and Oetomo (2005), and Frino, 
Gallagher and Oetomo (2006) still provide evidence that institutional investors are likely 
to incur greater impact with an increasing size in the overall trade. 
 
By examining the execution costs of a number of portfolios based on firm size, Stoll and 
Whaley (1983) find that smaller firms exhibit greater execution costs than their larger 
counterparts. The intuition behind this result is due to the notion that, all else being equal, 
smaller companies are less liquid making it more difficult to execute a trade order of the 
same size. Subsequent studies use a firm’s market capitalisation to control for firm sizee. 
Further, Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) find that the relationship between firm size, 
trade complexity and execution costs is not linear such that trades with greater volume in 
smaller sized firms incur the greatest price impact. These studies are consistent with the 
underlying theory as they provide considerable evidence in showing negative correlation 
between firm size and price impact. 
 
A number of studies have found it necessary to include a liquidity-based control measure 
in the price impact model. One such measure is the bid-ask spread (BAS), which has 
been used in studies including Aitken and Frino (1996b), Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), 
and Frino et al. (2007) and found to be significant. Lower liquidity is found to be 
                                                 
e Bonser-Neal et al. (1999), Chiyachantana et al. (2004), Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), and Frino et al. 
(2006). 
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associated with higher price impact as the above studies report and is due to the greater 
difficulty in finding a corresponding liquidity provider. 
 
Chiyanchantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) find that the asymmetry in purchases and 
sales is dependant upon the state of the market. They argue that permanent price impact is 
more likely to be associated with purchases (sales) in a bullish (bearish) market due to a 
greater probability that purchases will drive prices to a higher expected equilibrium price. 
Consequently, institutions looking to purchase shares will find it more difficult (easy) to 
find willing liquidity providers in a bullish (bearish) market as opposed to a bearish 
(bullish) market. Further, investor sentiment will force this impact to reflect permanent 
costs. This notion supports the evidence presented by Aitken and Frino (1996b), and 
found by Frino et al. (2007) who report that market returns are positively correlated with 
price impact in both purchases and sales by controlling for market-wide movements using 
the returns of relevant market indices. 
  
The above review suggests that trade size, firm size, stock liquidity (BAS) and market 
return are relevant in explaining the variation in execution costs. Subsequently, 
controlling for such variables is justifiable and consistent to previous price impact 
studies.  
 
The theories outlining the reaction of traders on the opposite-side of the market (Section 
2.1) have, to date, not been examined within the realm price impact literature. The 
reaction of the opposite-side trader has largely been overlooked for two reasons. First, 
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previous studies lack the available data to quantify the state of the opposite-side of the 
book. Second, studies involving the reaction of opposite-side traders are mainly 
concerned with ex-post order flow analysis whilst price impact literature is mainly 
concerned with conditions which are ex-ante to the execution of an institutional trade. 
Thus, by introducing an ex-ante variable into the model (and hypothesising the ex-post 
reaction of the market), the present study looks to identify whether the reaction of 
opposite-side matters. 
 
3. Hypothesis Construction 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Analysis regarding the state of the opposite-side of the book has largely been overlooked 
by much of the price impact literature due to its difficulty in finding a proxy that captures 
the ex-ante state of the limit order book. Subsequently, the following section introduces 
an appropriate ex-ante instrument which has not been used in similar price impact 
studies. More importantly, this section provides possiblef reasons for the movement and 
variation in this instrument.  
 
                                                 
f By no means does this study look to empirically justify the actions of the liquidity providers, rather this 
study intends to provide possible reasons for the significance of the instrument. These reasons are not 
exhaustive and only serve to theoretically support the use of such an instrument in this study. 
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This measure will allow the present study to capture the market reaction and revision of 
order depth as proposed by Dupont (2000) and found by Kavajecz (1999). Further, it will 
capture both the concentration and competitiveness that exist between the brokers on the 
opposite-side of the market. By focusing on the order cancellation component of this 
variable, the concepts of order revision due to adverse information (Dupont 2000) can be 
introduced. Thus, this variable will allow one to assist institutions regarding the timing of 
their trades and determine the ideal conditions where trading will incur the lowest price 
impact. 
 
This study incorporates the use of a Herfindahl-index which acts as an instrument for the 
concentration of the opposite-side of the limit order bookg. It will be used to determine 
the sensitivity that exists between the levels of broker concentration prevailing at the time 
of a trade, to the overall price impact of the trade. 
 
3.2 The Mechanics of the Herfindahl -Index 
 
The index is used to create a numerical representation of the opposite-side of the order 
book that captures the concentration and competitiveness of brokers in terms of the depth 
posted immediately before the execution of a trade. Previous studies have used two types 
                                                 
g The value at the market price is independent of the value of the second best price. Thus, to provide 
meaningful results, the index is only constructed at the market price and is not aggregated among the 
opposite-side. 
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of measures to analyse concentration. The Herfindahl-index increases as the number of 
brokers decreases or as the proportion of the leading broker increases. This index places 
greater weight on the leading broker’s concentration and thus allows one to identify two 
general market conditions (high broker concentration and low broker concentration) more 
readily than using the number of brokers since it takes into account the depth posted by 
each broker as well as the broker’s relative presence on the market. 
 
The Herfindahl-index is calculated for stock i at time t using the following formula: 
 
2
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where Hit represents the concentration of opposite-side limit order market depth in stock i 
and Vijt represents the limit order depth posted by broker j for stock i immediately prior to 
the first trade t. 
 
This formula will provide a number ranging from 0 to 10,000 for every trade event in 
stock i. Lower levels of the index imply the opposite-side of the market is highly 
competitive with many postedh limit orders across many brokers, thus depth is spread and 
                                                 
h The author acknowledges that there exists the presence of hidden orders and traders not visible to the 
market (but would trade under favourable circumstances); however, data constraints prohibit the 
examination of these traders. 
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more diluted. Higher levels of the index imply that the opposite-side of the market is less 
competitive in providing liquidity in terms of broker competition thus, depth is more 
concentrated around few brokers. It is important to establish that the index does not 
measure the volume of liquidity provided but, rather, the broker concentration 
surrounding the liquidity. This study is interested in identifying whether the broker 
concentration on the opposite-side of the market has the ability to affect the price impact 
of subsequent trades. As such, different levels of the index can be observed with the same 
amount of shares being provided to the trade initiator. This concept is explained in 
Appendix A. Further, the calculation of the index implies that the actual identity of the 
brokers becomes irrelevanti. The dominant broker in one index may be different to the 
dominant broker in another index; however they are treated the same in the calculation of 
their respective indices. Certain brokers may react differently to new information; 
however it is beyond the scope of this study to identify which brokers are more 
responsive to information rather it intends to identify the ideal conditions for trading - 
high broker concentration or low broker concentration - in the general casej. 
 
Since the Herfindahl-index used in this study is focused on the order depth and 
concentration of various brokers on the opposite side of the market, it is important to 
                                                 
i The study only requires that depth posted by one broker can be differentiated from depth posted by 
another broker.  
j For example, if low concentration levels provide lower price impact, a trade initiator will prefer to wait for 
many different brokers on the opposite-side providing a similar amount of shares before executing an order.  
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identify the factors which have the ability to influence the levels of the instrument. There 
are three typical events that will change the Herfindahl Index of a stockk.  
 
(1) Order Cancellations 
(2) Order Additions 
(3) Trade Executions 
 
First, brokers controlling orders on the opposite-side of the market’s best prevailing price 
may withdraw order flow for various reasons. By cancelling an order, depth is reduced at 
the market price and consequently requires less executable volume (from subsequent 
trades) to move prices. This type of behaviour can be expected to be used to combat the 
risk of trading under adverse selection against larger trades, or to reflect new information 
that a broker receives. Unlike the models of Garman (1976) and Dupont (2000) that 
examine a hybrid market and focus on specialist trades, the ASX has no bodies officially 
providing market making duties. Thus, instead of reducing order flow to the minimum 
depth requirements as seen by Kavajecz (1999), this study should observe specific 
brokers withdraw close to all of their depth at the market price.  
 
Second, the addition of new orders at the market price will result in a change in the level 
of the index. Although this is unlikely to occur against a large institutional trade, this 
phenomenon may exist when traders trade against a known uninformed large order, or 
                                                 
k Referring to one side of the bid ask spread – the opposite side of the trade initiator – for stock i at time t. 
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illegally in the case of front running. Nevertheless, it is not the focus of this study to 
examine the placement of new orders against or in response to an incoming trade.  
 
Finally, an executed trade will change the level of the index since executed orders will no 
longer be visible by the standing limit order book. This event will have the same effect on 
the index as the cancellation of identical order flowl.  
 
Thus, by looking at changes in the Herfindahl-index, it is difficult to distinguish whether 
changes in the Herfindahl-index have occurred due to cancellation, addition, or execution 
of orders. Additionally, the change in the index will largely depend on which broker 
withdraws an order, which broker places new orders or which broker’s orders are 
executed againstm. Consequently, the resulting movements in the index will provide 
ambiguous results. The current study avoids these problems by analysing the Herfindahl-
index level immediately prior to the first trade execution of a sequence. Needless to say, 
this study intends to isolate the effects of the index where cancellations are present. 
 
                                                 
l The main difference being that trade initiators will require less subsequent shares to execute the full 
amount of their desired quantity. 
m If the dominant broker cancels depth, the Herfindahl-index will decrease but if a non-dominant broker 
cancels depth, the Herfindahl-index will increase. The same applies to whether trades are executed against 
the dominant broker or a non-dominant broker. This will be largely due to the time preference of the orders 
(which may be random in the sample). Similarly, whether a completely new broker enters the market (Jt+1 = 
Jt +1), or whether the dominant or non-dominant broker enters a new order will affect the Herfindahl-index 
with the same ambiguity. 
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The aim of this study is to determine whether it is beneficial for a trade initiator to 
consider the nature of the opposite-side of the market when deciding upon the timing of 
their trades. In order to do this, several hypotheses are put forward to explain the possible 
significance and direction of the additional variable in its relationship with price impact. 
It is important to distinguish between the ex-ante instrument and its relation to the ex-post 
actions of liquidity providers. The present study offers possible reasons for the ex-post 
actions of the liquidity providers that may be more prevalent under a certain ex-ante 
condition. These actions are not exhaustive and only provide possible explanations for 
the direction of the instrument. The following sub-sections introduce the null and 
alternative hypotheses that will be used to determine the ideal conditions for trading. 
 
3.3 The Null Hypothesis 
 
Evidence of the null hypothesis occurs when the Herfindahl-index provides statistically 
insignificant results when measuring its sensitivity to price impact. It implies that the 
nature of broker competition on the opposite-side of the market has no distinguishable 
relationship to the price impact of subsequent trades. In essence, this means that the 
cancellations and withdrawal of order flow is independent of whether there are plenty of 
competing brokers or when there are a few dominant brokers.  
 
Therefore, the Null Hypothesis (H0) states: the level of the Herfindahl-index prior to the 
first trade plays no role in the price impact of subsequent trades. 
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3.4 Alternative Hypothesis 1: The Role of the Dominant Broker 
 
Unlike the null hypothesis, the first alternative proposes that lower levels of the 
Herfindahl-index are ideal for traders since higher levels are associated with greater price 
impact of subsequent trades. To explain this, consider the following case where a large 
Herfindahl-index is observed prior to the first trade. 
 
Suppose a trade initiator intends to purchasen 2,000 shares of the stock XYZ at time t, and 
another X amount of shares at t+1 (to comply with the assumption that the trader plans to 
trade in a sequence). The current market ask price stands at 10.00 dollars with 11,000 
available shares. Depth is shared among four (opposite-side) brokers labelled A, B, C and 
D (with A controlling time priority over the rest). Further, the broker competition is low 
on the opposite side of the market, with many smaller brokers (competition in order 
depth) competing against one large dominant broker (assume this is B). The Herfindahl-
index associated with this event and prior to the first trade stands at 5,661. Figures 3.4.1 
and 3.4.2 show the differences in the null and first alternative hypotheses respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
n For brevity this example only examines a buyer-initiated trade. This example can be inverted to apply to a 
seller-initiated trade.  
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Figure 3.4.1 
Trading with large concentration under the null hypothesis 
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Figure 3.4.2 
Trading with large concentration under the first alternative hypothesis 
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For both examples, as the timeline moves from a to b, 2,000 shares are executed against 
Broker A. The null hypothesis assumes that the structure of the book has no bearing on 
the price impact of subsequent trading. Consequently, the general reaction of the market 
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will be to remain the same on averageo and the order book arrives at 3.4.1c. A further 
9,000 shares are required to be executed against the current price of 10.00 dollars in order 
to move the price to the next level. Thus, so long as X is less than 9,000, the trader will 
incur no further price impact costs. This is different to figure 3.4.2c where the dominant 
or leading broker in the group of opposite-side brokers (Broker B) withdraws their depth 
in order to protect against trading under adverse selectionp. Hence the limit order book 
arrives at 3.4.2d where only a further 1,000 shares are required to move the price to the 
next tick. Consequently, if X is greater than 1,000, any shares greater than the 1000th 
share will incur an extra 5c cost per share, adding to the price impact of the overall series 
of trades. 
 
The reasons and theoretical justification underlying the dominant broker hypothesis are 
implied by Garman (1976), Dupont (2000) and Kavajecz (1999) who show that market 
makers withdraw depth in order to protect themselves against the risk of trading under 
adverse selection. Although these papers differ from current study since they assume a 
monopolistic market making condition, similarities can be inferred since the specialist 
may, at times, control significant proportions of depth at the market price. This has been 
empirically observed by Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) who observe specialist 
participation rates in the NYSE and find that their activity in a stock ranges from 10 
                                                 
o Brokers B, C or E could cancel their orders in response to the execution of Broker A’s shares however, 
the null hypothesis assumes that these occur randomly and in no significant pattern. 
p The broker could also have received an informational signal externally, or be withdrawing for rebalancing 
purposes. 
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percent (implying dilution in depth) to 90 percent (implying concentration in depth). On 
most occasions, therefore, these specialists would in fact be regarded as the ‘dominant’ 
broker for the purposes of the current study. 
 
The main difference between this study and those previously mentioned, lies within the 
information advantage a specialist has over the general trading population. This 
advantage may explain the faster response to executed orders as seen by specialists. The 
current study postulates that brokers who control a significantly higher proportion of 
order depth in one stock will be more likely to monitor and readily respond to 
informational discrepancies as opposed to brokers who control lower proportions in the 
same stock. 
 
The reasoning behind an initiating trader intending to execute multiple orders is 
explained by Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) who suggest that large 
orders can be executed with less price impact when split into sets of medium-sized trades 
since the information content of trades is less likely to be noticed. One could argue that 
initiating traders would wait for appropriate conditions such that the dominant broker 
cannot detect their presence, thus lowering the price impact of their trades. The present 
study acknowledges this possibility and postulates that price impact due to the 
cancellation of orders, although lower, may still be present at medium-sized orders 
(depending on the probability that the dominant broker can identify an informed trade), 
and subsequently it intends to discover whether this is indeed significant enough to alter 
the timing of broker trade executions. 
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Therefore, Hypothesis 1 (H1) states: given higher levels of the Herfindahl-index prior to 
the first trade, subsequent trading incurs greater price impact due to the cancellation and 
withdrawal of order depth from the leading broker who protects against adverse 
selection.  
 
The first alternative hypothesis assumes that higher levels of the index that are associated 
with greater price impact which may be caused by the dominant broker withdrawing 
order depth. This corresponds to the previous example in which Broker B withdraws their 
depth order (Figure3.4.2c). Theoretically, Broker C could cancel their order depth instead 
of Broker B. This would still result in fewer shares being required to move the price level 
(8,500) than the null (9,000), thus providing support for the first alternative hypothesis. 
Although both cases require fewer shares being required to move the price in subsequent 
trades, the former requires considerably less (1,000) and would thus provide more 
significant overall price impact than the latter. Therefore, the greater the number of cases 
where the dominant broker withdraws order depth, the more significant higher levels of 
the index will become.  
 
3.5 Alternative Hypothesis 2: The Herding Effect 
 
The second alternative hypothesis proposes that higher levels of the Herfindahl-index are 
ideal for traders since lower levels are associated with greater price impact of subsequent 
trades. 
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Figure 3.5.1 
Trading with low concentration under the null hypothesis 
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Suppose a trade initiator intends to purchase 2,000 shares of the stock XYZ at time t, and 
another X amount of shares at t+1. The current market ask price stands at 10.00 dollars 
with 11,000 available shares. In this case the concentration of depth among brokers is 
diverse and shared among six (opposite-side) brokers labelled A, B, C, D, E and F (with 
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Broker A controlling time priority over the rest). Figures 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 show the 
differences in the null and second alternative hypotheses respectively.  
 
Figure 3.5.2 
Trading with low concentration under the null hypothesis 
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This example works similarly to the previous where the null hypothesis results in a limit 
order book requiring a further 9,000 shares to increase the price of XYZ, as shown by 
Figure 3.5.1c. Comparing this to Figure 3.5.2c, it is assumed that one broker out of the 
five remaining on the opposite side of the market withdraws their depth in order to 
protect against trading under adverse selectionq. For simplicity, assume this to Broker B. 
Given a herding type of behaviour exists between institutions the remaining brokers may 
follow the lead of Broker B and withdraw their shares. Assuming brokers C and D 
conform to this behaviourr, the limit order book arrives at 3.5.2d. Subsequently, only 
3,000 sharess are required to move prices to the next tick level. Similar to the previous 
example, the region at which X lies between the two figures (3,000 < X < 9,000) reveals 
the amount of shares where the trade-initiator will incur greater price impact under the 
second alternative hypothesis. 
 
As noted by the discussion in Section 2.1, herding behaviour is known to exist among 
institutions for three reasons. Firstly, they may observe the same information signal and 
act in the same manner as one another resulting in the correlation of their trades. Second, 
                                                 
q In this hypothesis, it does not matter which opposite-side broker firstly withdraws their depth since it is 
beyond the scope of this study to examine the performance of individual brokers.  
r Only two out of the remaining four brokers are used to simplify this example. In reality, any number of 
brokers can conform to this idea. 
s It does not matter that this amount is greater than its counterpart in the first alternative. This discrepancy 
is purely due to the nature of the examples and can be adjusted to equal the amount given in the first 
example. 
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they may follow the trades by competing portfolio managers in order to hedge the risk of 
being outperformed. Lastly, they may follow the lead of a broker who they believe to be 
informed. The previous example assumes this is the case. In essence, any of the above 
reasons can explain why the behaviour of institutions is correlated (if this is found in the 
results).  
 
The correlation between the actions of brokers on the opposite-side of the book forms the 
basis of the second alternative hypothesis. Since brokers have the ability to both enter an 
exit the market freely by posting or withdrawing limit orders, the correlation in their 
actions drives whether price impact will be larger under more diverse concentration 
conditions. The actions and correlations of brokers can result in four cases; 
 
Table 3.5 
Broker Correlation against Broker Behaviour 
Cancel Order Do Not Cancel Order
Positive (a) Highest Risk (c) Lowest Risk
Negative (b) Low Risk (d) High Risk
Broker Behaviour
Broker 
Correlation
 
Broker Correlation is positive when herding is evident. Broker behaviour represents whether an 
opposite-side broker withdraws an order from the limit order book. 
 
Table 3.5 shows the different alternative correlations and actions between brokers. When 
actions of the brokers are positively correlated (a), the decision to cancel an order 
presents the highest risk to an incoming trader, whose subsequent trades will incur much 
more impact than the other cases. It implies that cancellation from one broker (for any of 
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the reasons stated above) will induce cancellations from other brokers resulting in a 
number of cascading cancellations occurring one after anothert. This is consistent with 
the results reported by Biais et al. (1995). Thus case (a) would suggest that more diverse 
the concentration is associated with greater the price impact. On the other hand, a 
negative correlation between brokers will be more beneficial to an incoming trader (under 
diverse concentration conditions) in the presence of order cancellations (b) since it will 
essentially hedge the risk of the trades incurring a substantial amount of price impact. 
This contradicts the second alternative hypothesis and may explain why diverse 
concentration is less significant. The final two scenarios are worth mentioning since they 
assume that trades are not cancelled. In essence, a positive correlation would be 
beneficial to an incoming trader since there is minimal risk of a cancellation among all 
opposite-side brokers (c). The present study, however, intends to focus on the 
cancellation of orders, possibly due to the risk of adverse selection. 
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states: given lower levels of the Herfindahl-index prior to 
the first trade, subsequent trading incurs greater price impact due to positive correlation 
in institution behaviour in the presence of order cancellation. 
 
It seems logical to suggest, given the previous discussion, that the methodology involved 
to test the second alternative hypothesis would involve examining of the correlation 
                                                 
t This may be consistent with algorithmic trading in which orders are automatically placed (and withdrawn) 
based on mathematical criteria. The presence of algorithmic traders also accounts for the speed at which 
trades can be cancelled. 
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between the cancellations among brokers. This would involve the examination of the ex-
post order flow directly. Instead, this study focuses on the state of the opposite-side of the 
order book since this is an ex-ante measure which is more useful for forecasting price 
impact costs. 
 
3.6 Final Considerations 
 
The nature of the two alternative hypotheses implies that the two are not mutually 
exclusive. It is possible to find instances where both the dominant broker hypothesis and 
herding behaviour are evident. If this is the case, then the current study will identify the 
alternative hypothesis that is more evident from the data and therefore more useful to 
traders. 
 
A further reason behind the first alternative hypothesis involves the consideration of the 
risk towards an incoming trader. Under the assumption that broker behaviour is 
uncorrelated and that a single, random, broker may withdraw depth due to one of the 
previously mentioned reasons, the probability of a larger number of shares being 
withdrawn is higher under a high value of the Herfindahl-index. This is due to the 
existence of a dominant broker on higher values of the index, whereas lower index values 
provide a hedge against this risk. 
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4. Preliminaries 
Having studied the structure of the ex-ante instrument used to capture opposite-side depth 
concentration and identifying possible reactions of liquidity providers, this study now 
proceeds to examine whether the phenomena exists empirically. A large body of 
literature has been devoted to identifying the determinants of price impact in order to 
assist institutional trading. These past studies have provided the foundation for the 
methodology used in this investigation. 
 
4.1 Review of Institutional Trading 
 
A significant amount of attention has been devoted in prior literature to the estimation of 
the execution costs for trading in equities securities. An investor faces two types of 
transactions costs when trading. Explicit costs are paid to the broker or exchange for 
providing the service to trade, whilst implicit costs are the embedded costs from 
execution. The present paper does not examine explicit costs since the state of the 
opposite-side of the market is independent of the commission costs for trading. Instead, it 
simply focuses on the implicit costs of trading which, by itself, have been found to be 
relevant and economically significant by Keim and Madhavan (1998) in their survey of 
equity trading costs. 
 
Price impact literature has been developed to examine whether specific factors can 
influence the implicit costs of trading. Much of the literature has focused on institutional 
trading since it accounts for a significant amount of overall trading volume. Thus, 
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understanding the determinants of price impact can result in the implementation of better 
trading strategies from traders. As such, the study of institutional trades is important since 
the performance of money managers are highly sensitive in their ability to execute shares 
with the least amount of transactions costs. This provides sufficient motivation in 
understanding the nature of its determinants.  
 
Kraus and Stoll (1972) initially examined whether large institutional trading moved 
markets away from an efficient market by examining the price impact following large 
block trades. A block trade was defined as a large number of shares that can be executed 
on the secondary (equities) market. Much of the early papers could not distinguish 
between an institutional and non-institutional transaction and subsequently used block 
trades to adequately infer institutional tradesu.  
 
Using transaction data from institutional firms, many of the later studies could readily 
identify and distinguish an institutional trade. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) argue that 
institutional orders may be divided up into several trades. This is consistent with Barclay 
and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) whose studies suggest that informed trades 
are likely to be executed using medium-sized orders (as opposed to large). Thus, what 
appeared to be an institutional trade may not have been the actual ex-ante amount of 
shares desired to be traded. Consequently, it was argued that the analysis of a single 
institutional order provides misleading results when examining the price impact of 
                                                 
u See for example, Holthausen et al. (1987), Keim and Madhavan (1996), Gemmill (1996), Frino et al. 
(2007). 
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institutional trading. Instead, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) propose a method which 
involves the use of a trade package to substitute for the ex-ante expression of desired 
trade quantity of an institutional trade. This instrument involves the analysis in the 
collection of a sequence of executed trades executed by the same institution in the same 
stock and direction for a specified period of time. This period of time is determined by 
the time elapsed between subsequent trades (Chan and Lakonishok (1995) use a 5-day 
gap as the standard). Chan and Lakonishok (1995) acknowledge that this instrument, 
which is intended to estimate the desired ex-ante expressions of desired trade quantity, 
actually provides an ex-post approximation. In essence, price movements and market 
conditions resulting from early trades of a sequence may influence or discourage 
subsequent trading. However, they argue that a trade package will be a close 
approximation of the desired ex-ante order since the decision to trade was formed on the 
basis that the stock was substantially mispriced and thus a small price concession is not 
likely to reverse the initial trading decision. Further, using evidence provided by Kiem 
and Madhavan (1996), they argue that since the proportion of unexecuted orders remains 
small, the likelihood of discouraging later trades is minimal. Due to the nature of this 
approximation, subsequent studies which have not been able to determine whether a 
single transaction is part of a larger order have adopted this method for estimating 
institutional tradingv. 
 
The dataset used in this study suffers from two distinct disadvantages in comparison to 
the datasets used in previous studies. Firstly, in order to examine the concentration of 
                                                 
v See for example, Chan and Lakonishok (1997), Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), Frino et al. (2006). 
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broker depth, the present paper requires a dataset which permits the separate 
identification of broker depth on the opposite-side of the market. Therefore, the use of 
order level data was preferred such that the Herfindahl-index was able to be calculated. 
This dataset however, cannot distinguish between an institutional and non-institutional 
trade. Second, the dataset cannot not identify whether one trade is part of a sequence of 
institutional orders and thus the true quantity of an institutional ex-ante order is unknown. 
The present paper therefore utilises a method consistent with Aitken and Frino (1996b). 
This method permits the analysis of data which cannot readily identify institutional trades 
as well as considers the notion that an institution may use multiple trades to execute a 
desired quantity. The remainder of this study defines a large trade event as its estimate for 
an institutional trade. A large buy (sell) trade event is defined as the sequence and 
combination of purchases (sales) executed by the same broker on a given stock on a 
single day where the total trading volume is greater than the stock’s average daily trading 
volume over the past three months. Although Chan and Lakonishok (1995) observe that 
only 20 percent of the value of institutional trades on NYSE and American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) stocks takes place over one day, Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) find 
that the average life of an identically defined trade package is executed in 1.5 days on the 
ASXw. This average is further skewed right by a heavy tail indicating that only the largest 
or most complicated (which may suggest trades in non-institutional illiquid stocks) trade 
                                                 
w A similar result is found by Frino et al. (2006) who likewise use a trade package to study execution costs 
on the ASX. 
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packages take more than 1 day to executex. This justifies the examination of large trade 
events restricted to one trading day.  
 
There are several advantages to using this approximation in the present study. Schwartz 
and Shapiro (1990) estimate that institutional trades represent a larger than the average 
trade and thus the current proxy captures some proportion of institutional trading. This is 
consistent with the analysis of block trades in the past, which have been used as adequate 
approximations for institutional trading activity. Further, the current proxy addresses the 
theory that a single order may not represent the true desired ex-ante order of an 
institutional investor. More importantly, the examination of multiple sequential orders in 
the same direction directly allows the examination of the market response variable. In 
essence, the motivation for hypothesising the reaction of the market is only useful if a 
trader is intending to execute a series of trades.  
 
Whilst combining the advantages of the two methods widely used in prior literature, the 
large trade event methodology also has some important considerations. Chan and 
Lankonishok (1993) find that institutional trading is much larger than the typical daily 
trading volume in small stocks, while only account for less than 40 percent in larger, 
more liquid stocks. This presents two problems to the large trade event methodology. 
 
                                                 
x The 25th and 75th quartiles are equivalent to 1.00 trading day (see Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) Table 1 
pp 36) 
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Firstly, this method will only capture the largest trade sequences which are dependant on 
the average daily trading volume of the stock over the prior 30 trading days. Thus it will 
not capture the complete activity of institutional traders and consequently will not be as 
clean as studies directly examining institutional data. Using trade packages, Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995) find that the average size of institutional trades relative to typical 
trading volumey is 0.66 for purchases and 0.61 for sales. The current approximation will 
identify larger trades that have proportions which are greater than 1. Nevertheless, this 
study will analyse cases where institutional trading is most problematic allowing results 
to be relevant for larger ex-ante quantities. Further, this study can account for smaller 
institutional trades by the application of regression analysis. This is consistent with 
Aitken and Frino (1996b).  
 
The second consideration for the use of the large trade event methodology involves the 
analysis of illiquid stocks. Since illiquid stocks will have a smaller amount of average 
daily trading volume, fewer shares are required for a sequence of orders to be classified 
as a large trade event. As such a single small trade in these stocks may account for over 
100 percent of the average daily trading volume on a single day. Consistent with Aitken 
and Frino (1996b), the present study compensates for this by limiting the sample to the 
most liquid stocks. As such, large trade events are filtered and are restricted to trades in 
                                                 
y Chan and Lakonishok (1995) use a 40-day definition instead of the 30-day definition used here. A 30-day 
definition was used to maintain consistency with Aitken and Frino (1996b) which the large trade event 
method is based upon.  
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stocks categorised by the S&P/ASX200z. Constituents of this index are considered to be 
the largest 200 stocks based on float-adjusted market capitalisationaa. Further, the sample 
is restricted to large trade events that contain more than one trade execution to complete 
in order to remove such cases as stated above. This is also consistent with the notion with 
the assumption that an initiator intends to execute a series of trades.  
 
5. Institutional Details 
 
In the period at which this study examines, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
operated on an electronic order-driven trading system known as the Stock Exchange 
Automated Trading System (SEATS). Trading takes place using a continuous auction 
between the normal trading hours; 10am and 4pm where limit and market orders can be 
placed with strict price and time priority. No official market-making activities are used in 
the exchange and orders are traded on a call auction basis for the first and last 10 minutes 
of normal trading. 
 
The limit order book is restricted to registered brokers who may provide and consume 
liquidity to using limit and market orders. There are two available methods for a broker to 
withdraw depth from the book; amendments and deletions. The former involves reduction 
                                                 
z This index is updated quarterly. As such, the current study uses updated constituents in its filtration 
process. 
aa The index covers over 80 percent of equities market capitalisation on the ASX. 
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of quantity without affecting an order’s time priority. The latter involves the complete 
removal of depth at a given price and thus loses its priority over other standing limit 
orders. Although amendments closely resemble the options available to a specialist in a 
hybrid market, the stated hypotheses assume that adverse selection and the risk of trading 
against an informed trader is what drives the withdrawal of order depth. Thus, in the 
presence of high information asymmetry between parties, deletions are more likely to be 
encountered as opposed to amendments. For this reason, this study only examines order 
deletions. 
 
Prior to December 2005, a broker’s orders and executions were identified by all market 
participants using identification tags. The period of examination lies before this date and 
therefore brokers can readily identify and calculate the concentration of the depth 
regarding the opposite-side of the market. As of December 2005, broker identification 
tags were hidden to all market participants. Thus, if one of the competing hypotheses is 
supported, a broker would not be able to consistently calculate the true value of the 
Herfindahl-index concentration measure today. Nevertheless, a significant result in this 
paper will provide insight into what drives price impact. Further, it will contribute to the 
debate surrounding anonymity and be used to assist brokers trading under transparent 
conditions.  
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5.1 Data 
 
The dataset used for this study extends from January 1 2002 to December 31 2003. Data 
was provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) whose 
ASX Intra-day database captures records from all transactions taken from the ASX which 
have been captured from the Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS).  
 
The construction of a large trade event involves the identification of a series of executed 
trades from the same broker. Data from the ASX Intra-day database permits the use of 
broker identifiers to classify such events and was performed precisely to the paper’s 
definition before delivery. Thus, each record conveys details regarding every large trade 
event residing from the examined period. The actual identity of the broker initiating a 
large trade event was not available for analysis which is acceptable since the 
investigation does not intent to postulate the actions of specific brokers. Further, in order 
to examine the composition of the opposite-side of the market, broker identification tags 
were required to construct the measure used to account for depth concentration (the 
Herfindahl-index). Although the actual identity of the brokers were not able to be 
obtained, the use of masked broker identification tags were permitted to be used for the 
creation of the index. Subsequently the index was able to be constructed for the best (and 
second best) bid or ask (depending on the direction of the trade) prices immediately prior 
to a large trade event. 
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The ASX Intra-day database can be separated into three section; trade details, order 
details and index details. Each large trade event record contains details of both trade and 
quote data for all stocks listed on the ASX. Table 5.1.1 provides a list of fields obtained 
Table 5.1.1 
Data Set received 
Field Name Field Description
Date The date at which the large trade event has taken place
First Trade Time The time at which the first trade in a large trade event was executed
Last Trade Time The time at which the last trade in a large trade event was executed
Stock Code The Standard and Poor's stock identifier for the stock in which the large trade event has occurred
Trade Direction Identifies whether the large trade event was performed under a buyer or seller initiated sequence of transactions
Opening Price The daily opening price on which the large trade event was executed
Closing Price The daily closing price on which the large trade was executed
VWAP The volume-weighted-average price of trades executed by the single initiating broker whose sequence of trades forms the large trade event
Market Capitalisation The market capitalisation of the stock defined as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the mid-point of the daily price
Initiating Shares The total number of shares (in the same direction) executed by the single initiating broker over the period of the large trade event
Total Buy Shares The total number of shares executed by all brokers at the ask price over the period of the large trade event
Total Sell Shares The total number of shares executed by all brokers at the bid price over the period of the large trade event
Initiating Executions The number of executed trades (in the same direction) performed by the single initiating broker over the period of the large trade event
Total Buy Initiations The total number of executed trades performed by all brokers at the ask price over the period of the large trade event
Total Sell Initiations The total number of executed trades performed by all brokers at the bid price over the period of the large trade event
Normal Trading Volume The average daily trading volume of the stock in the prior three months
Bid-Ask Spread The time-weighted bid-ask spread calculated over the period of the large trade event
Duration Specifies the number of minutes taken to complete the large trade event (from the first trade to the last)
Volatility Provides the volatility in stock returns of the previous 5, 10 and 180 days
H-index Provides the Herfindahl-index at the market ask (bid) price for a purchase (sale) immediately prior (to the nearest second) to the first trade of a large trade event
H-index2 Provides the Herfindahl-index at the second best ask (bid) price for a purchase (sale) immediately prior to the first trade of a large trade event
Shares Ask (bid) The number of standing limit order shares available for trade at the best ask (bid) price immediately prior to the first trade of the large trade event
Shares2 Ask (bid) The number of standing limit order shares available for trade at the second best ask (bid) price immediately prior to the first trade of the large trade event
Av5Del Shares ask (bid) The minute average number of deleted shares at the ask (bid) price calculated over the prior 5 minutes to the first trade of a large trade event
Av5Del Orders ask (bid) The minute average number of deleted orders at the ask (bid) price calculated over the prior 5 minutes to the first trade of a large trade event
Del Shares ask (bid) The number of deleted shares at the ask (bid) price over the next minute after the execution of the first trade of a large trade event
Del Orders ask (bid) The number of deleted orders at the ask (bid) price over the next minute after the execution of the first trade of a large trade event
All Ords First The level of the daily All Ordinaries Index at the start of the trading day
All Ords Last The level of the daily All Ordinaries Index at the end of the trading day  
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The original dataset contains 84341 observations regarding large trade events within the 
sample period. There were 1222 observations containing missing values due to the 
unavailability of data. Such observations were deleted immediatelybb.  
 
The Taqtic database provided by SIRCA, was used to identify the constituents of the 
S&P/ASX200 in quarterly intervals. After the filtration of the dataset to include stocks 
comprising of the S&P/ASX200, 838 observations remained. The significant reduction in 
observation points highlights the sensitivity of the definition of a large trade in its ability 
to capture illiquid stocks. Data was used from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2003. 
The growth in the ASX since the time at which Aitken and Frino (1996b) performed their 
study may explain the increase average daily trading volume required to be classified as a 
large trade. This will further increase due to the emergence of algorithmic trading.  
 
Additional filters were placed on the dataset. Observations where the number of 
executions required in completing a large event was equal to one were deleted, allowing 
hypothesised ex-post actions of the liquidity provider to be relevant. Further observations 
were deleted in cases where the initiator was the only trader in a stock on a given day 
since this was not representative of a liquid stock. Finally, since the sample was small, 
                                                 
bb Missing observations was mainly due to the unavailability of values of the All Ordinaries Index. Further 
missing observations was due unavailability of data to calculate the bid-ask spread, however, after filtering 
for the constituents of the S&P/ASX200, it was seen that these observations would have been omitted 
anyway. 
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inferences were highly sensitive to large influential data points. Therefore the inter-
quartile range test was used to filter extreme data pointscc. These data points were viewed 
before deletion and 84.33 percent of observations were constituents of the bottom half of 
the S&P/ASX200dd. The final data sample consisted of 593 large trade events covering 
1.59billion dollars in principal.  
 
5.2 Preliminary Analysis 
 
In order to understand the nature of the sample dataset, standard descriptive statistics are 
used to evaluate how closely the data resembles analysis in prior studies. Since a large 
trade event is used to infer an institutional trade, it is useful to examine how quickly they 
can be executed. 
 
The duration of a package is defined as the number of minutes required to execute all 
trades making up a large trade event. Table 5.2.1 reports the frequency distribution of 
large trade events by length. Each panel shows the proportion of the number large trade 
events that were executed within the specified time frame. Further, the principal total is 
shown to standardise the number of packages against the dollar value of its shares. The 
difficulty in executing large trade events is evident. For the most part, only 25.13 percent 
of the value of all large trade events is completed within three trading hours. 
                                                 
cc 1 3 1 3 3 11.5*( ), 1.5*( )Q Q Q Q Q Q− − + −  
dd This was done by comparing outliers to the S&P/ASX100. 
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Table 5.2.1 
Frequency Distribution of Large Trade Events against Duration 
Trade Events 13.66 11.47 21.42 53.46
Principal 18.42 5.33 9.06 67.18
Trade Events (35.58%) 12.80 8.06 20.85 58.29
Principal (24.86%) 12.69 6.50 13.91 66.91
Trade Events (64.42%) 14.14 13.35 21.73 50.79
Principal (75.14%) 20.32 4.95 7.46 67.27
90 91-180 181-270 271-360
Panel B: Purchases (211 Large Trade Events, $395 Million Principal)
Panel C: Sales (382 Large Trade Events, $1194 Million Principal)
Duration (min)
Panel A: All Trades (593 Large Trade Events, $1589 Million Principal)
 
Each number in this table represents the percentage of large trade events executed within the indicated number of minutes. Principal 
amounts represent the percentage of large trades weighted by the dollar principal (VWAP). Trade events are reported for large 
purchases (sales) which comprise of a sequence of trades by the same broker in the same direction where the total volume of the large 
trade exceeds the 30-day average normal trading volume of the underlying stock. 
 
This suggests that the treating block trades, as used by other studies, as institutional 
trades can be misleading since the majority of trades take more than 3 hours to complete. 
Further, since 67.18 percent of the value of trades requires greater than four and a half 
hours to execute, some large trades may require more than one day to complete. This is 
consistent with Chan and Lakonishok (1995) who find that approximately 20 percent of 
institutional trading occurs within one day. Nevertheless, both Comerton-Forde et al. 
(2005) and Frino et al. (2006) report a one day average to complete a trade package. 
 51
 
Comparing Panels B and C, a greater number of sales were witnessed over the period. 
Further, 20.32 percent of the value of sales can be executed within 90 minutes as 
compared with 12.80 percent for purchases. This suggests that a large sale can be 
completed faster than an identical large purchase. 
 
Table 5.2.2 provides other relevant statistics regarding the sample of large trade events 
used in this study. Panels A and B report the average shares and dollar value observed in 
each large event. It shows that the average large buy (sale) event is composed of 893,000 
(1,571,000) shares worth 1, 873,000 Australian dollars (3, 126,000 Australian dollars). 
These observations are at odds when compared to Australian trade package studies such 
as Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) and Frino et al. (2006) who observe institutional trades 
containing between 245,000Australian dollars and 365,000 Australian dollars in dollar 
value. The difference between the current study and the previous can be attributed to the 
different instruments used to measure institutional trading costs since the values 
presented in this study resemble Aitken and Frino (1996b), who report larger average 
dollar values for institutional trading (1.123 million Australian dollars for purchases and 
1.163 million Australian dollars for sales). Consequently, both this study and Aitken and 
Frino (1996b) examine only the largest proportion of institutional trading. 
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Table 5.2.2 
Other Characteristics of Large Trade Events 
Mean 1,330 893 1,571
10th percentile 122 122 122
25th percentile 195 181 417
Median 405 368 417
75th percentile 885 852 896
90th percentile 1,988 2,100 1,970
Sum 788,432 188,318 600,114
Mean 2,680 1,873 3,126
10th percentile 145 191 125
25th percentile 276 333 518
Median 585 711 518
75th percentile 1,486 1,871 1,259
90th percentile 3,677 3,511 3,857
Sum 1,589,310 395,105 1,194,205
Mean 1.62 1.47 1.71
10th percentile 1.04 1.05 1.04
25th percentile 1.11 1.11 1.30
Median 1.27 1.25 1.30
75th percentile 1.62 1.55 1.70
90th percentile 2.19 1.95 2.43
Mean 0.59 0.37 0.87
10th percentile 0.05 0.05 0.07
25th percentile 0.09 0.07 0.23
Median 0.18 0.15 0.23
75th percentile 0.40 0.35 0.50
90th percentile 0.89 0.86 1.10
Panel D: Large Trade Event Size Relative to 95th Percentile of Trading Volume
Panel B: Dollar Value of Large Trade Event (Thousand $AUD)
Panel A: Shares Traded (Thousands)
Total Purchases Sales
Panel C: Large Trade Event Size Relative to Normal Trading Volume
 
This table provides a description of the large trade events. Trade events are reported for large purchases (sales) which comprise 
of a sequence of trades by the same broker in the same direction where the total volume of the large trade exceeds the 30-day 
average normal trading volume of the underlying stock. Descriptive statistics are shown for both purchases and sales. In Panel C, 
relative normal trading volume is calculated as the 30-day average normal trading day volume for the underlying stock. In Panel 
D, large trade event size is divided by the 95th percentile of the distribution of trading volume over the average 30-day period.  
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However, this is not a limitation since both Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) and Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995) observe the distribution of institutional trades (both the number of 
shares and dollar value) to be highly skewed to the right. As such, the sample used will 
still provide useful results and regression analysis can be used to make inferences for 
smaller institutional trades. 
 
Panel C reports the relative size for every trade event standardised against the 30-day 
average trading volume for a given stock. The average large trade event is 62 percent 
larger than the typical trading volume of a given stock. By definition, all trades examined 
in this study must be larger than the average daily trading volume of a stock in order to be 
classified as a large trade. The relative size of a large event follows closely to Chan and 
Lakonishok’s (1995) classification of the third quintile group for firm size (with a mean 
of 1.75 for purchases and 1.57 for sales). Further, they report that institutional trades 
occur in the largest firms sometimes at three times the normal trading volume (the top 1 
percent of packages). The largest (90th) percentile documented in this study reports an 
average of close to 2.48 times normal trading volume, suggesting the sample is composed 
with relatively large firms which justifies the use for the filtration of the initial sample 
with the S&P/ASX200 index.  
 
Panel D accounts for the variability in a stock’s daily trading volume by measuring the 
size of a large trade event against the average daily trading volume of the 95th 
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percentileee.  The present study finds similar results to Panel C as the variation in trade 
size is large with the largest trades contributing significantly to the mean.  
 
6. Methodology 
6.1 Execution Costs 
 
This paper follows methodology consistent with prior literature. This study separately 
captures the different components of the implicit costs of trading using the following 
measures; 
 
Open-to-Trade (Total Impact) = 
Price Opening
Price OpeningVWAP−     (1) 
Trade-to-Close (Temporary Impact) = 
VWAP
VWAPPrice Closing −    (2) 
Open-to-Close (Permanent Impact) = 
Price Opening
Price OpeningPrice Closing −   (3) 
 
A large trade event is constructed by identifying a series of aggregated trades from a 
single broker in one stock. To examine the effects of each, purchases and sales are 
separated. The volume-weighted-average-price, VWAP, is used to represent the overall 
price paid (received) by a buyer (seller) initiated trade. Opening Price and Closing Price 
is used as the pre and post benchmark measures to determine the implicit costs of trading. 
                                                 
ee The 95th was chosen to be consistent with Chan and Lakonishok (1995). 
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These are defined as the opening and closing share prices for a given stock on the same 
trading day. These measures are consistent with those used by Chan and Lakonishok 
(1993) and Aitken and Frino (1996b). 
 
Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Holthausen et al. (1987) provide theoretical justification for 
the separate analysis of the price impact components. Holthausen et al. (1987) show that 
short-run liquidity costs can be measured by temporary impact (2). They argue that 
insufficient substitutes, inelastic demand curves and information effects can be used to 
explain the permanent movement in a stock’s price (3). Finally, they state that overall 
movement in the stock resulting from the trade can be measured through total impact (1). 
Further, this measure is used to identify the initial impact of a trade. At first glance, one 
would expect to find opposite-side depth concentration to be most prevalent under the 
Open-to-Trade and Open-to-Close measures. Cancellations of immediate order flow will 
directly affect the initial impact of a trade event, and assuming these cancellations were 
forced due to adverse selection, a permanent impact would be observed by the Open-to-
Close measure. 
 
6.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
To ensure consistency with previous price impact studies, regression analysis is used to 
test the joint relationship that exists between execution costs, opposite-side depth 
concentration, and a set of relevant control variables. As identified in Section 2, studies 
have shown that trade size, firm size, market return, length of the trade and size of the 
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spread have significant explanatory power in determining execution costs. Hence the 
following regression is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares for both purchases and 
sales: 
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ipPI ,  represent one of the three variations (p) in the measurement of price impact costs: 
Open-to-Trade Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close for large trade event i. iH is used to 
estimate the opposite-side depth concentration and thus takes the value of the Herfindahl-
indexff prevalent on the market ask (bid) price immediately prior to the first executed 
trade of a large purchase (sale). The variables ijD and ijS are a set of dummy variables 
which control for the impact of both the size of the trade and size of the firm. A trade’s 
complexity measures the difficulty in the execution of a large trade event. This paper 
defines complexity as the proportion of shares traded by the initiating broker relative to 
the total amount of shares traded on the same side of the market over the duration of the 
large trade eventgg. Firm size is defined as the underlying stock’s current market 
                                                 
ff The same adjustment is made in this section where any large purchase (sale) which had less than 1000 
shares available at the market ask (bid) price used the Herfindahl-index at the second best price instead. 
gg Complexity has been measured using other proxies such as share volume, the number of relative broker 
executions, the dollar value of shares traded, or trading volume relative to normal trading day volume. The 
current definition used in this study is consistent with literature and was chosen since it provided the best 
fit. 
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capitalisation at the time of the first trade. Both complexity and market capitalisation are 
classified into four groups: <25th percentile, 25th-50th percentile, 50th-75th percentile, and 
>75th percentile. Using the smallest percentile <25th as a base for both measures, a 
dummy variable is assigned for each category in each trade event, i. This type of 
classification is consistent with Chan and Lakonishok (1995) who argue that trade size, 
firm size and execution costs are not linearly related. iBAS  is defined as the time-
weighted bid-ask spread of the underlying stock over the duration of large trade event, ihh. 
It is used to control for the liquidity of the underlying stock. iDuration  is measured as the 
number of minutes taken to execute a large trade eventii. Finally, iR  represents the 
arithmetic returns of the All Ordinaries Index calculated on the day of the trade and 
controls for market-wide movements in price. 
 
6.3 Description and Direction of Explanatory Variables 
 
Section 3 identifies the possible alternative hypotheses regarding the correlation of the 
opposite-side depth concentration variable with execution costs. A positive relationship 
between in relation to execution costs suggests that the risk of cancellation and 
subsequent price impact is higher when fewer brokers dominate the opposite-side of the 
market. Alternatively one may find a negative relationship exists, where lower 
                                                 
hh This study also considered the intensity ratio as used by Aitken and Frino (1996b) but found no 
significance. 
ii The natural logarithmic transformation of duration is used to provide a better fit. 
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concentration levels suggest a correlation between broker actions in terms of the 
cancellation of order flow. Although these two events may not be mutually exclusive, 
regression analysis will show which effect is more dominant and whether it is 
consistently affecting execution costs (found through significance). 
 
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) argue that both firm size and trade size are significantly 
related to execution costs. They find that larger sized trades represent trades with greater 
difficulty to execute since the task of finding short-run liquidity becomes difficult as the 
size gets larger. Thus a positive (negative) relationship is expected to be observed 
between the variable for complexity and execution costs for purchases (sales). Further, 
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) argue that institutional trades executed on larger stocks will 
incur the least amount of execution costs since liquidity is expected to be higher and 
more readily available as compared to smaller stocks. Consequently, a negative (positive) 
relationship is expected to be observed between the variable for firm size and execution 
costs for purchases (sales). Finally, using the grouping approach, as defined above, 
provides a better fit to the model by allowing the non-linearity of the variables to be 
modelled as Chan and Lakonishok (1995) have suggested. 
 
Studies such as Aitken and Frino (1996b) and Frino et al. (2007) find it necessary to 
control for the bid-ask spread of the underlying stock such that tighter spreads are 
associated with higher liquidity and lower price impact. Thus, one would expect a 
positive (negative) relationship between the time-weighted bid-ask spread and execution 
costs for purchases (sales).  
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Duration is a variable which has been used to control for institutional trades that take 
more than one execution to complete. Consequently, this variable has only been used by 
the recent studies using trade packages and large trade events. Nevertheless, this variable 
can represent the difficulty in executing the large trade (represented by permanent price 
impact), or it can show the patience of the initiator to obtain lower costs (represented by 
temporary price impact). Such mixed results are found by Comerton-Forde et al. (2005). 
 
Finally, the market return variable controls for systematic movements involving stocks in 
the exchange. Thus if the market is growing, purchases (sales) will be more likely to 
incur permanent price impact and less subsequent price reversal.  
 
7. Results 
7.1 Average Execution Costs 
 
Table 7.1.1 examines the trading costs measured across purchases and sales. Results from 
this data show a 0.86 percent (0.95 percent) average price increase (decrease) relative to 
the opening price on the day at which a large purchase (sale) was executed. Further, the 
average price impact does not revert after the trade. The absence of price reversal from 
the Trade-to-Close measure results in a higher overall permanent price impact for all 
large trade events. The lack of price reversal is at odds with price impact literature, which 
generally finds an asymmetry in price reversal following an institutional trade. The 
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Table 7.1.1 
Execution Costs 
Panel A: Purchases (n = 211)
Mean 0.86 0.27 1.14
Standard Deviation 1.61 1.78 2.62
t -statistic 7.81 2.19 6.31
Proportion>0 0.65 0.57 0.60
10th percentile -0.78 -1.16 -1.64
25th percentile -0.01 -0.38 0.00
Median 0.55 0.05 0.72
75th percentile 1.69 1.00 2.30
90th percentile 3.25 2.30 4.82
Panel B: Sales (n = 382)
Mean -0.95 -0.55 -1.48
Standard Deviation 1.86 2.29 3.35
t -statistic -10.01 -4.70 -8.63
Proportion<0 0.62 0.54 0.59
10th percentile -3.61 -2.34 -5.08
25th percentile -1.69 -0.95 -2.37
Median -0.55 -0.02 -0.69
75th percentile 0.00 0.32 0.00
90th percentile 1.09 1.17 1.37
Execution Costs
Open-to-Trade 
(%)
Trade-to-
Close (%)
Open-to-Close 
(%)
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of each of the three different execution costs that are reported for each large 
trade event: Open-to-Trade measures the pre-execution benchmark and initial price impact, Trade-to-Close measures 
the post-execution benchmark and Open-to-Close measures the total price impact. Execution costs are reported in 
percentage returns. Panel A represents large purchases and Panel B represents large sales. 
 
results suggest otherwise and a large trade event is likely to be associated with 
subsequent price permanent impact. A number of implications can be drawn from this 
result. First, large trade events may be more likely to be associated with information. 
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Second, due to their size, large trade events may be traded more patiently. This is 
consistent with Table 5.2.1, showing 67.18 percent of the dollar value of all large trade 
events being executed over 4.5 hours. Finally, large trade events may be more likely to be 
executed in stocks with imperfect substitutes or inelasticity in its supply and demand 
schedules.  
 
Notably, the total execution costs are generally higher than previous studies have 
reported. Aitken and Frino (1996b) report the average execution costs measured from the 
Open-to-Close at -0.01 percent (-0.08 percent) for purchases (sales) which suggests that 
the institutional trading definition is not the cause for the greater execution costs. The 
findings are however, similar to Bonser-Neal et al. (1999) who measure the Open-to-
Close at 1.82 percent and -0.37 percent for purchases and sales. They attribute this to the 
bid-ask bounce associated with taking pre and post trade benchmarks at the open and 
close of the day.  
 
7.2 Price Impact of High and Low Opposite-Side Depth Concentration 
 
Table 7.2.1 reports execution costs relative to opposite-side market concentration. The 
Herfindahl-index is measured at the market price. Since the study’s analysis focuses on 
market depth, there exists the possibility that insignificant small depth is posted within 
the quotes making the new market price (and the Herfindahl-index attached) 
unrepresentative of the true concentration of depth. 
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Table 7.2.1 
Concentration against Execution Costs 
Panel A: Purchases (n = 211)
Execution Costs
Mean 1.14 0.40 1.55 0.59 0.14 0.73
Standard Deviation 1.67 1.68 2.86 1.50 1.88 2.30
t -statistic 7.00 2.43 5.57 4.03 0.76 3.24
Proportion>0 0.74 0.56 0.63 0.57 0.58 0.57
10th percentile -0.71 -1.42 -1.64 -0.85 -0.88 -1.74
25th percentile 0.00 -0.49 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.21
Median 0.76 0.12 1.40 0.33 0.02 0.50
75th percentile 2.08 1.10 3.11 1.18 0.81 1.84
90th percentile 3.55 2.52 5.42 2.66 2.02 3.57
Panel B: Sales (n = 382)
Mean -1.27 -0.72 -1.97 -0.63 -0.39 -0.99
Standard Deviation 1.82 2.59 3.44 1.84 1.94 3.20
t -statistic -9.67 -3.82 -7.92 -4.71 -2.75 -4.28
Proportion<0 0.71 0.55 0.65 0.53 0.52 0.52
10th percentile -3.80 -2.96 -5.71 -3.04 -1.92 -4.55
25th percentile -2.23 -1.11 -3.31 -1.24 -0.70 -1.79
Median -0.81 -0.10 -1.14 -0.11 0.00 -0.21
75th percentile 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.27 0.32 0.56
90th percentile 0.35 1.17 0.66 1.39 1.18 1.85
Low Concentration (Bottom 50%) H < 7985 High Concentration (Top 50%) H > 7985
High Concentration (Top 50%) H > 8667Low Concentration (Bottom 50%) H < 8667
Open-to-Trade 
(%)
Trade-to-
Close (%)
Open-to-Close 
(%)
Open-to-Trade 
(%)
Trade-to-
Close (%)
Open-to-Close 
(%)
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the execution costs; Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close measured in 
percentage returns.  Large trades are separated as into two classes defined through the Herfindahl-index level being greater (less) than 
the medium for high (low) concentration. The Herfindahl-index is calculated by: 
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 where and Vijt represents the 
limit order depth posted by broker j for stock i immediately prior to the first trade t. The index at the second best market price is used 
when the number of shares posted on the best price on the opposite-side is less than 1000.Trade events are reported for large purchases 
in Panel A and large sales in Panel B which comprise of a sequence of trades by the same broker in the same direction where the total 
volume of the large trade exceeds the 30-day average normal trading volume of the underlying stock. 
 
To account for this, any Herfindahl-index that was calculated with a total volume of 
shares less than 1000 was replaced with the Herfindahl-index at the second best price. 
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Panel A describes the behaviour of execution costs that involve the purchasing of shares. 
Lower concentrations of depth are associated with 1.14 percent, 0.40 percent and 1.55 
percent increases in price for Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close 
measures respectively. This is comparatively higher than events associated with higher 
concentrations of depth, which result in 0.59 percent, 0.14 percent and 0.73 percent 
increases in price for the respective measures. Clearly one can see that higher 
concentration of depth is associated with lower comparative impact. Similar behaviour 
can be found in Panel B, which reports the same measures under large sales. The 
consistency of the execution costs in both Panel A and B provide support for the second 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
To further examine the second alternative hypothesis, one may compare the opposite-side 
concentration with the frequency of cancellations at each respective market price. 
Cancellations are calculated as the total amount of shares removed at the market ask (bid) 
within 1 minute after a large purchase (sale) has executed the first of a sequence of 
trades,jj to the total shares executed in the same direction (for all brokers) over the 
duration of the trade event. 
 
Thus it measures the size of orders withdrawn relative to the total shares executed over a 
large trade event. Table 7.2.2 provides tentative support for the second alternative 
                                                 
jj One does not assume causality between the initiating order an the cancellation. There may be multiple 
reasons for the withdrawal of depth.  
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hypothesis. It shows that a lower concentration of opposite-side order depth has a higher 
likelihood of attracting withdrawal of depth as compared with higher concentrations. 
 
Table 7.2.2 
Cancellations versus Concentration 
Panel A: Purchases (n = 198)
Low Concentration High Concentration
Cancellation (%) 0.56 0.05
Standard Deviation 3.04 0.33
t -statistic 1.89 1.65
Panel B: Sales (n = 356)
Low Concentration High Concentration
Cancellation (%) 0.34 0.28
Standard Deviation 2.24 2.01
t -statistic 2.13 1.91  
Cancellations are calculated as the number of orders deleted at the market ask (bid), observed 
one minute after the first executed trade of a large trade event, relative to the number of shares 
executed at the ask (bid) for large purchases (sales). Large trades are separated as into two 
classes defined through the Herfindahl-index level being greater (less) than the median for high 
(low) concentration. The Herfindahl-index is calculated by: 
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 where and Vijt 
represents the limit order depth posted by broker j for stock i immediately prior to the first 
trade t. The index at the second best market price is used when the number of shares posted on 
the best price on the opposite-side is less than 1000. 
7.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
The results of the regression analysis are provided in Table 7.3.1. It provides some 
evidence supporting the validity of the variables predefined by prior literature and their 
ability to explain execution costs. This study finds the following: 
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Table 7.3.1 
Results of Regression Analysis 
Coefficient Coefficient p Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Intercept 1.20 -0.74 0.68 -2.00 ** 1.86 -2.66 **
Concentration -0.000143 *** 0.000116 *** -0.000051 0.000068 * -0.000199 *** 0.000182 ***
Complexity
   1 (least) 0.08 -0.45 * 0.01 -0.09 0.08 -0.53
   2 0.11 -0.93 *** 0.07 -0.14 0.18 -1.05 **
   3 (most) 0.59 ** -0.60 ** 0.14 -0.29 0.73 -0.86 *
Market Capitalisation
   1 (smallest) -0.62 ** 0.94 *** 0.37 0.96 *** -0.24 1.87 ***
   2 -0.88 *** 1.17 *** 0.35 1.28 *** -0.53 2.40 ***
   3 (largest) -1.02 *** 1.35 *** -0.17 1.25 *** -1.18 ** 2.56 ***
Bid-Ask Spread 0.35 *** -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.50 *** 0.00
Duration 0.13 -0.26 ** -0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.23
Market Return 0.60 ** 0.38 0.33 0.66 ** 0.93 * 1.04 **
Adj Rsquared 10.92% 14.32% -1.34% 5.02% 6.13% 12.97%
Purchases SalesPurchases Sales Purchases Sales
Open-to-Trade Trade-to-Close Open-to-Close
 
This table reports the results from the following regressions: 
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where PIp,i represent one of the execution costs measures; Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close. Hi represents opposite-
side depth concentration, Di captures trade complexity, Si captures market capitalisation, BASi measures the time-weighted bid-ask 
spread from the first to the last trade of a large trade event, Durationi captures minutes required to complete the large trade event. Ri is 
calculated as the return on the All Ordinaries Index on the day of the large trade event, i. 
*Denotes 10 percent significance 
** Denotes 5 percent significance 
*** Denotes 1 percent significance 
 
A distinct relationship can be inferred between opposite-side concentration and execution 
costs due to the significance in the Open-to-Trade measure. The negative (positive) 
coefficient on purchases (sales) indicates that lower index values are more likely to be 
associated with larger price impact. Thus the concentration variable accounts for a 0.14 
(0.12) percent decrease in the total impact for purchases (sales) for every 1,000 added. 
The direction and correlation are more important than this interpretation since it is 
difficult to quantify the specific volume and number of brokers needed on the opposite-
side of the market that are required to reduce costs. Nevertheless, correlation is clearly 
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negative and evidence of a continuation in price reduction is found by the Trade-to-Close 
measure. In fact, a higher index is significantly associated with less price impact 
suggesting that large traders believe there is less risk in the loss of order flow (via 
withdrawal of depth) when trading against few brokers with high proportions of depth on 
the opposite-side of the market. 
 
Due to a small sample size, not all the variables were found to be significant. As such, 
mixed results are found. For the most part, variables are qualitatively consistent with 
prior literature. Execution costs incrementally increase from the smallest sized trades to 
the largest and are consistent with literature. The coefficients for the trade complexity 
move from 0.08 to 0.59, 0.01 to 0.14 and 0.08 to 0.73 for Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close 
and Open-to-Close measures for purchases and -0.45 to -0.60, -0.09 to -0.29 and -0.53 to 
-0.86 for sales. These imply that in moving from the smallest (base case) sized trades to 
the largest (1,2 and 3), prices generally rise for purchases and falls for sales reflecting the 
difficulty of executing a larger trade. This is consistent with the idea that larger sized 
trades convey more information. Mixed results, however are seen for sales since the 
middle group is shown to have a larger price impact than the largest group. This is 
significant in our sample and inconsistent with literature. 
 
Coefficients for firm size move from -0.62 to -1.02, and -0.24 to -1.18 for Open-to-Trade 
and Open-to-Close measures for purchases and 0.94 to 1.35, and 1.87 to 2.56 for sales. 
This is consistent with the notion that smaller sized firms incur greater overall price 
impact due to their illiquidity when compared to larger firms. It also suggests that larger 
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stocks have less permanent impact due to their ability in having elastic supply and 
demand curves. These results are not consistent when measured by Trade-to-Close. It 
shows a price reversal for purchases in the first and second groups of stocks when 
compared to the base. For sales, the results suggest that trading in medium sized firms 
incurs the least amount of impact. This is not consistent with the notion that liquidity is 
greater in larger stocks.  
 
The coefficients for the bid-ask spread, are all positively (negatively) correlated for 
purchases and sales. Consistent with literature and illustrates that wider spreads are 
associated with greater price impact. 
 
The duration of a trade may be influenced by more than one factor. The difficulty in 
execution, as large trades move to a longer duration, is evident from the Open-to-Close 
measure, reporting a 0.05 percent increase and -0.23 percent decrease in the price for the 
average stock in purchases and sales respectively. This is may be due to the greater 
complexity of the trade and also implies a more informed trade. Further, price reversal is 
illustrated by the Trade-to-Close measure (-0.08 percent for purchases and 0.04 percent 
for sales) suggesting that patient traders are able to obtain lower costs. This is consistent 
with the findings of Comerton-Forde et al. (2005). 
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Table 7.3.2 
Contribution to R-Squared 
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Full Model 10.92% *** 14.32% *** -1.34% 5.02% *** 6.13% *** 12.97% ***
Excluding Concentration 5.98% *** 11.39% *** -1.40% 4.55% *** 2.70% * 10.79% ***
Excluding Complexity 10.15% *** 11.72% *** 0.05% 5.58% *** 6.32% *** 12.25% ***
Excluding Market Capitalisation 6.69% *** 7.58% *** -1.51% 0.87% 4.76% *** 4.91% ***
Excluding Bid-Ask Spread 7.39% *** 14.54% *** -1.38% 5.27% *** 3.57% ** 13.20% ***
Excluding Duration 10.96% *** 13.23% *** -0.98% 5.36% *** 6.56% *** 13.00% ***
Excluding Market Return 9.59% *** 14.05% *** -1.27% 4.30% *** 5.00% ** 12.09% ***
Open-to-Trade Trade-to-Close Open-to-Close
 
This table represents the adjusted R-squared values of the full model: 
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where PIp,i represent one of the execution costs measures; Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close. Hi represents opposite-
side depth concentration, Di captures trade complexity, Si captures market capitalisation, BASi measures the time-weighted bid-ask 
spread from the first to the last trade of a large trade event, Durationi captures minutes required to complete the large trade event. Ri is 
calculated as the return on the All Ordinaries Index on the day of the large trade event, i. From the full model, one variable at a time is 
removed, the regression re-estimated and the R-squared recalculated. 
*Denotes 10 percent significance 
** Denotes 5 percent significance 
*** Denotes 1 percent significance 
 
 
Finally, market return is consistently positive across all measures suggesting that market-
wide movements in stock prices play a major role in investor sentiment. Thus, purchases 
are more likely to exhibit greater impact than sales. This is consistent with Chiyachantana 
et al. (2004). 
 
Following the standard set by Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Table 7.3.2 is useful for 
outlining the contribution of each variable to the total variation in execution costs. This is 
done by removing one variable at a time (with replacement) from the full model. 
Significance tests are performed using the F-test identified in Greene (2003). The models 
examined in this model obtain adjusted R-squared statistics ranging from -1.34 percent to 
14.32 percent. This value is difficult to compare to other studies since different amounts 
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and types of variables are used. Nevertheless, Aitken and Frino (1996b) report R-squared 
statistics between 2.15 percent to 8.50 percent whilst using variables to control for order 
type and broker type. This result is an improvement in most areas of the model apart from 
purchases measured at the Trade-to-Close. The opposite-side concentration variable 
explains 4.94 (2.93) percent, 0.05 (0.47) percent and 3.43 (2.18) percent of the variation 
in Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close measures respectively. Comparing 
these values to the total amount explained by each model, the opposite-side concentration 
provides a large proportion of the variation. This is particularly evident in Open-to-Trade 
and Open-to-Close measures. This result is compelling since the benchmark used to 
calculate the previous two measures was the opening price on the day of the large trade 
event. Thus, the concentration prior to the first trade plays a major role in determining the 
impact of subsequent trades. This is also evident in sales, and its contribution in variation 
is only second to market capitalisation.   
 
7.4 Tests for Robustness 
 
The crucial aspect driving the value in its results lies in whether the relationship between 
opposite-side depth concentration and execution costs is robust throughout the sample. 
Additional tests were implemented to quantify reinforce a negative relationship, and 
support for the second alternative hypothesis, observed by the initial regression.  
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Table 7.4.1 
Concentration against Execution Costs 
Panel A: Purchases (n = 251)
Execution Costs
Mean 1.41 0.2535 1.74 -0.735 -0.242 -0.809
Standard Deviation 4.82 2.5276 6.29 7.4281 3.8641 9.5282
t -statistic 3.28 1.1257 3.10 -1.106 -0.699 -0.949
Proportion>0 0.72 0.5476 0.63 0.544 0.584 0.544
10th percentile -0.92 -1.649 -1.75 -5.537 -2.814 -7.407
25th percentile 0.00 -0.521 0.00 -0.578 -0.374 -1.205
Median 1.00 0.1179 1.48 0.1339 0.0256 0.4444
75th percentile 2.57 1.1746 4.65 1.4741 1.0029 2.069
90th percentile 5.12 3.0609 7.32 3.9534 2.1532 5.3299
Panel B: Sales (n = 445)
Mean -1.935 -0.914 -2.781 -2.457 -1.121 -3.432
Standard Deviation 4.6646 2.9022 6.056 6.5874 3.8614 8.5056
t -statistic -6.196 -4.705 -6.857 -5.558 -4.327 -6.012
Proportion<0 0.713 0.574 0.6637 0.5766 0.5721 0.5676
10th percentile -6.102 -3.827 -7.843 -10.05 -3.187 -14.08
25th percentile -2.791 -1.365 -4.054 -2.724 -1.176 -2.632
Median -0.912 -0.195 -1.248 -0.457 -0.078 -0.505
75th percentile 0 0.2877 0 0.2584 0.2601 0.4
90th percentile 0.4394 1.1978 0.9524 1.605 1.1298 2.0339
Low Concentration (Bottom 50%) H < 8513 High Concentration (Top 50%) H > 8513
Trade-to-
Close (%)
Open-to-
Close (%)
Low Concentration (Bottom 50%) H < 8557 High Concentration (Top 50%) H > 8557
Open-to-Trade 
(%)
Trade-to-
Close (%)
Open-to-Close 
(%) Open-to-Trade (%)
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the execution costs; Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close measured in 
percentage returns.  Large trades are separated as into two classes defined through the Herfindahl-index level being greater (less) than 
the median for high (low) concentration. The Herfindahl-index is calculated by: 
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 where and Vijt represents the limit 
order depth posted by broker j for stock i immediately prior to the first trade t. The index at the second best market price is used when 
the number of shares posted on the best price on the opposite-side is less than 1000. Trade events are reported for large purchases in 
Panel A and large sales in Panel B which comprise of a sequence of trades by the same broker in the same direction where the total 
volume of the large trade exceeds the 30-day average normal trading volume of the underlying stock. Large trade events are not 
initially filtered for outliers. 
 
To examine whether the relationship between the opposite-side depth concentration and 
execution costs exists is sensitive to the data filtration techniques, Table 7.4.1 provides 
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the average costs associated with high and low values of the index using the unfiltered 
sample 
 
Results for Table 7.4.1, Panel A show negative execution costs across all measures for 
purchases. Notably, these are all not significantly different from zero suggesting the 
presence of highly influential observations. Nevertheless, the general direction of the 
relationship between execution costs and the opposite-side depth concentration measure 
is negative for all purchases which can be seen by taking the difference between 
equivalent measureskk. This is consistent with the result obtained in Table 7.2.1, Panel A. 
 
Results for Table 7.4.1, Panel B are at odds with the initial relationship, hence further 
investigation was required. Regression analysis was performed and finds that the 
relationship holds over purchases, whilst sales produce positive coefficients that are 
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, due to the insignificance of sales under all 
execution cost measures, this robust test still provides weak support for the second 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
 
                                                 
kk For example, for the Open-to-Trade measure, the difference between high and low index values is - 0.73 
- 1.41 =  - 2.14. This indicates a reduction of 2.14 percent in the Open-to-Trade costs when moving from a 
low index value to a high index value.  
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7.5 Implications of Results 
 
The results from both descriptive statistic and regression analysis provide evidence for 
the second alternative hypothesis. Table 7.2.1 provides evidence that lower opposite-side 
depth concentration is associated with greater impact for both purchases and sales. 
Further, regression analysis shows a distinct negative relationship between the opposite-
side depth concentration measure and Open-to-Close and Trade-to-Close measures which 
is indicative of a permanent affect on stock price. This suggests actions taken by brokers 
on the opposite-side of the market are related to the informative nature of the trade being 
executed. Further, lower opposite-side depth concentration is associated with higher 
withdrawal of depth as shown by Table 7.2.2. This indicates that herding behaviour may 
exist among opposite-side brokers. Finally, the combination of these results is consistent 
with the notion that herding between brokers is present. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The behaviour of liquidity providers has been examined in the past by analysing the price 
changes of the order flow associated with their actions. The reaction of the liquidly 
provider is important since a withdrawal of depth will cause greater price impact for 
subsequent trades on that side of the book. This study introduces a Herfindahl-index to 
measure the concentration of posted depth on the opposite-side of the market prevailing 
at the time before an institutional trade. This is used within the context of price impact 
literature to determine the associated costs related to changes in the nature of the 
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opposite-side of the market. The general ex-post reactions of liquidity providers can then 
be approximated from this variable’s significance and direction. 
 
This study finds evidence that a significant negative relationship exists between opposite-
side depth concentration and the price impact measures for Open-to-Trade and Trade-to-
Close. This implies that the costs of executing a sequence of large trades is greater under 
a lower opposite-side depth concentration where depth is spread across different brokers 
holding relatively equal amounts of depth. This study also finds support for the notion of 
herding behaviour which can be used to explain the relationship empirically identified in 
the above analysis. A large proportion of this herding behaviour can be attributed to 
information due to the permanent price effects associated with withdrawal in order depth. 
 
This study contributes to price impact literature examining the variables causing the most 
variation in price impact. The opposite-side depth concentration explains 2.70 percent 
and 5.98 percent of the total variation in Open-to-Close and Open-to-Trade measures 
respectively. Further implications of this research suggest that institutional traders can 
manage trading costs by trading in stocks that have depth concentrated around fewer 
amounts of brokers. This however, can only be used in markets with pre-trade 
transparency.  
 
Finally, extensions of this study may involve the use of a cleaner proxy for opposite-side 
depth concentration that is not affected by the other actions of liquidity providers (such as 
order placement and order execution).
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Appendix A 
 
Consider a stock XYZ traded on and electronic limit order book. A trade-initiating broker 
wishes to go long on the stock by purchasing shares from the market. Assuming there are 
10,000 available shares outstanding at the market ask price of stock XYZ with five 
different brokers posting order depth, the limit order book may be depicted in an infinite 
amount of ways. For brevity, this study presents two different possible scenarios. 
 
Figure A 
2000=H  
 
 
 
 
Bid 
Ask 
     
 $9.95 
$9.90 
$9.85 
 
 
$10.00 
 
 
$10.05 
$10.10 
A - 2000 
Legend 
B - 2000 
C - 2000 
D - 2000 
E - 2000 
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Figure B 
4000=H  
 
 
The first scenario, depicted by Figure A, presents the case where the five brokers share 
the volume of posted depth equally. This scenario is considered the most competitive and 
diluted in terms of posted broker depth since no broker controls more depth than another 
and results in a Herfindahl index equal to 2,000.  
 
The second scenario, depicted by Figure B, shows a different case where one broker 
(Broker A) controls a significant proportion of posted depth in comparison to the rest. 
This would be considered as a less competitive scenario compared to the previous, since 
one broker controls most of the posted order depth and results in a Herfindahl index equal 
to 4,000.  
Bid 
Ask 
     
 $9.95 
$9.90 
$9.85 
 
 
$10.00 
 
 
$10.05 
$10.10 
A - 6000 
Legend 
B - 1000 
C - 1000 
D - 1000 
E - 1000 
 76
Appendix B 
 
Coefficient Coefficient p Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Intercept 2.20 2.83 1.08 -1.79 3.11 1.05
Concentration -0.000375 ** 0.000043 -0.000067 0.000003 -0.000434 ** 0.000053
Complexity
   1 (least) 0.61 -1.34 * 0.33 0.24 0.80 -1.09
   2 -0.61 -1.67 ** -0.78 0.37 -1.27 -1.32
   3 (most) -0.07 -1.67 ** 0.09 0.23 0.02 -1.44
Market Capitalisation
   1 (smallest) 3.67 *** 0.43 2.24 *** 1.40 *** 5.52 ** 1.65
   2 2.81 *** 1.97 *** 1.60 *** 2.13 *** 3.97 ** 3.85 ***
   3 (largest) 2.54 ** 3.12 *** 1.46 *** 2.22 *** 3.55 *** 5.04 ***
Bid-Ask Spread 0.00 -0.35 ** 0.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.40 *
Duration -0.23 -0.94 *** -0.36 -0.14 -0.50 -1.04 **
Market Return 3.45 *** 2.24 *** 1.67 *** 1.12 ** 4.75 *** 3.16 ***
Adj Rsquared 6.81% 7.45% 6.84% 6.38% 8.42% 8.80%
Purchases SalesPurchases Sales Purchases Sales
Open-to-Trade Trade-to-Close Open-to-Close
 
This table uses unfiltered data points and reports the results from the following regressions: 
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where PIp,i represent one of the execution costs measures; Open-to-Trade, Trade-to-Close and Open-to-Close. Hi represents opposite-
side depth concentration, Di captures trade complexity, Si captures market capitalisation, BASi measures the time-weighted bid-ask 
spread from the first to the last trade of a large trade event, Durationi captures minutes required to complete the large trade event. Ri is 
calculated as the return on the All Ordinaries Index on the day of the large trade event, i. 
*Denotes 10 percent significance 
** Denotes 5 percent significance 
*** Denotes 1 percent significance 
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